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I. INTRODUCTION
Law is not static; it changes over time as new facts and new situations
force the law to adapt. Twentieth century laws will not be able to account
for twenty-first century technology. As time progresses, the law will have to
evolve in order to deal with previously unanticipated situations driven by
technological advances.
In particular, international law will soon be inadequate to cope with new
issues created by the exploration of outer space. Difficult problems are
already cropping up and will only continue to multiply. New technology and
the increasing involvement of private actors drive many of the areas where
current international space law will prove insufficient.
These problems, which once seemed as far off as the stars, are now
looming over the horizon. In October 2012 a private company, SpaceX,
launched “the first official commercial flight to the International Space
Station.”1 Since that time, SpaceX has conducted six missions to the
International Space Station and is in the process of testing a reusable rocket.2
Another company, Planetary Resources Inc., has millions of dollars in
backing and plans to mine asteroids for their mineral resources in the near
future.3 Other companies are focusing on extracting valuable resources from
the moon.4 It is unclear what economically viable rights on the moon those
companies will be able to establish.5 Similar questions will arise for
asteroids: Does anyone own an asteroid? How did the owner establish
ownership? Ventures to mine resources and explore outer space could have
a tremendous effect on humanity by providing scarce resources and an
avenue for continued space exploration.6
Other private businesses are expanding into space as well. Several
companies are working on conducting space tourism flights, ferrying
1

First Official Commercial Cargo Flight Heading to International Space Station, CNN
(Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/07/us/spacex-launch/index.html?hpt=hp_t1.
2
Steve Almasy & Amanda Barnett, SpaceX Launch Successful but Historic Booster
Rocket Landing Fails Again, CNN (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/14/us/space
x-rocket-launch/.
3
Jesse Riseborough & Thomas Biesheuvel, Google-Backed Asteroid Mining Venture
Attracts Billionaires, BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/20
12-08-06/google-backed-asteroid-mining-venture-adds-billionaire-investors.
4
Adam Mann, Loophole Could Allow Private Land Claims on Other Worlds, WIRED (Apr.
5, 2012), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/04/moon-mars-property/.
5
Id.
6
Nancy Atkinson, Schweickart: Private Asteroid Mission Is for the Benefit of Humanity,
UNIVERSE TODAY (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.universetoday.com/96727/schweickart-privateasteroid-mission-is-for-the-benefit-of-humanity/.
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passengers for a quick jaunt into outer space (and, of course, passengers can
buy space traveler’s insurance first).7 Even before these flights occur, the
Earth’s orbit is already littered with space debris that endangers flights,
satellites, space stations, and people on the ground.8
These examples and more will demonstrate the likely shortcomings of
current space law. Numerous proposals have been suggested to deal with
each of these issues but will not be enough. Legal disputes are inevitable no
matter which specific rules are adopted. With an increasing number of actors
moving into outer space, the number of disputes will surely rise. The
international community should establish a forum to adjudicate those
disputes. Such a court should be unbiased, multilateral, and have the power
to enforce its decisions.
This Note will first look at the current governing international space law,
predominately two treaties: the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability
Convention. Next, it will discuss current proposals to fill gaps in that law,
such as the application of private property rights in outer space. This Note
will use those proposals to illustrate the need for a dispute resolution system
over outer space cases. Finally, the Note will propose a specific system in
the form of an international court. It will suggest goals for this court and
rules to help the court fulfill those goals.
II. BACKGROUND
Space law includes both international and domestic law covering outer
space activities.9 Five treaties control international space law: the Outer
Space Treaty,10 the Rescue Agreement,11 the Liability Convention,12 the
7

Zach Everson, 11 Questions about the Future of Space Tourism Answered, CONDÉ NAST
TRAVELER (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.cntraveler.com/stories/2015-03-18/11-questions-abou
t-the-future-of-space-tourism-answered; Kenneth Chang, Booking a Flight to Space, With
Travel Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/science/sp
ace/spaceflights-prepare-to-expand-customer-base.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. To reserve
your seat on a future flight, see http://staging.virgingalactic.com/booking/.
8
Steven A. Mirmina, Reducing the Proliferation of Orbital Debris: Alternatives to a
Legally Binding Instrument, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 649, 649–52 (2005).
9
Space Law: Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE
AFFAIRS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/FAQ/splawfaq.html#index (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
10
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
11
The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue
Agreement].

2014]

FIRST CONTACT

801

Registration Convention,13 and the Moon Agreement.14 This Note will
primarily focus on the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention.
The Rescue Agreement aims “to develop and give further concrete
expression to” the duties outlined in the Outer Space Treaty that direct states
to give “all possible assistance to astronauts . . . and [to] return objects
launched into outer space.”15 The Registration Convention mandates that
launching states register their space objects and that the Secretary-General of
the United Nations maintain a central registry of all those objects.16
Finally, the Moon Agreement establishes general principles governing
activities on the moon.17 The Moon Agreement limits activities on the moon
to “peaceful purposes,” “carried out for the benefit . . . of all countries.”18
The Moon Agreement declares that “[t]he moon and its natural resources are
the common heritage of mankind.”19 Developing nations have argued that
the common heritage of mankind theory protects their interests in
international natural resources by providing common ownership.20 Only
fifteen countries are parties to the Moon Agreement,21 and thus it is not
binding international law upon most states.22
A. The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty establishes general principles and guidelines for
activities in space. It is known as the “ ‘constitution’ of outer space” because

12

The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
13
The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
14
The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.S.T. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
15
Rescue Agreement, supra note 11, at pmbl.
16
Registration Convention, supra note 13, arts. II, III.
17
Moon Agreement, supra note 14.
18
Id. arts. 3, 4.
19
Id. art. 11.
20
Milton L. Smith, The Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space, in
SPACE LAW: VIEWS OF THE FUTURE 45, 51 (Tanja L. Zwaan ed., 1988).
21
Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaty
status/index.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2014).
22
David Johnson, Limits on The Giant Leap for Mankind: Legal Ambiguities of
Extraterrestrial Resource Extraction, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1477, 1487 (2011).
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of “[i]ts broad and general nature and content.”23 Agreed to in 1967, the
Outer Space Treaty was forged out of Cold War diplomacy, in a world where
the United States and Soviet Union simultaneously engaged in an arms race
and a space race.24 This treaty, like any other, resulted from the state of
geopolitics and technology of the time—in this case the 1960s.
The Outer Space Treaty covers a broad range of topics, much of it
reflecting those Cold War concerns. It attempts to demilitarize space,
especially the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space.25 Along
the same lines, it espouses the importance of “co-operation and mutual
assistance” and pushes for consultations and agreements between states as
the mechanisms for working together in space.26
This multilateral
cooperation is one of the core goals of the Outer Space Treaty as it was
intended to prevent competition between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. that could
have spiraled out of control.27
The Outer Space Treaty includes restrictions on the use of outer space and
its resources. Article I directs that the “exploration and use of outer
space . . . be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries . . . and shall be the province of all mankind,” but allows “free
access to all areas of celestial bodies,” and encourages scientific studies.28
Article II, known as the non-appropriation clause, states: “Outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation.”29 These provisions may restrict private entities from
obtaining property rights in outer space.
State liability is also addressed in the Outer Space Treaty. First, it deems
states responsible for their own activities and the activities of their
nationals.30 The treaty puts the onus on states to approve and regulate
ventures into outer space.31 Second, the Outer Space Treaty establishes that
a state responsible for a space object (either by launching it or procuring its
launch) is liable to another state or a state’s nationals for any damage caused
23
Siegfried Wiessner, Human Activities in Outer Space: A Framework for DecisionMaking, in SPACE LAW: VIEWS OF THE FUTURE, supra note 20, at 7, 8. The Outer Space Treaty
has also been called the “Magna Carta” of outer space. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 20, at 46.
24
Brian Beck, The Next, Small, Step for Mankind: Fixing the Inadequacies of the
International Space Law Treaty Regime to Accommodate the Modern Space Flight Industry,
19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 12 (2009).
25
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV.
26
Id. arts. IX–XII.
27
See Beck, supra note 24, at 12.
28
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I.
29
Id. art. II.
30
Id. art. VI.
31
Id.
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by the space object.32 These rules are further developed in the Liability
Convention, which in many ways implements these standards.
1. On Property Rights
There is some debate about the impact of the province of mankind and
non-appropriation clauses on the legality of extracting resources from space.
The most commonly accepted interpretation of the province of mankind
clause is that it reaffirms the free access rights established in Article I.33
Other scholars argue that as long as an activity in space benefits all nations in
some general sense, even if the benefit is indirect, then the activity is
permitted under the Outer Space Treaty.34
There is, however, some tension between the ability to freely “use” outer
space and the principle of non-appropriation. Many scholars agree that
establishing a “keep-out” zone or declaring territorial ownership over a
portion of outer space or a celestial body would be an appropriation in
violation of the Outer Space Treaty.35 This is in tension with a “use” of outer
space that prevents someone else from using the same outer space resource.36
A possible explanation differentiates between an appropriation as a territorial
claim to sovereignty and a use that does not impinge on other states’ equal
usage rights.37
The Outer Space Treaty’s “province of mankind” language can also be
distinguished from the common heritage principles of the Moon Agreement,
which goes even further in protecting the interests of non-spacefaring
states.38 For example, during the ratification process in the U.S. Senate for
the Outer Space Treaty, the Committee on Foreign Relations attached an
understanding that “nothing in Article I, paragraph 1 of the treaty diminishes

32

Id. art. VII.
Johnson, supra note 22, at 1500–01 (suggesting that the province of mankind provision
affirms an equal right to access, instead of prohibiting certain actions).
34
Smith, supra note 20, at 46–47 (noting that satellites provide weather reports,
telecommunications, and greater knowledge about outer space, benefitting most nations even
though they do not directly own or benefit from the satellites).
35
See, e.g., Beck, supra note 24, at 25–26.
36
Wiessner, supra note 23, at 13 (questioning why positioning a satellite in geostationary
orbit would not amount to an appropriation or why consumption of an asteroid’s minerals
would be a “use” but not “appropriation”).
37
Johnson, supra note 22, at 1501–02.
38
Id.
33
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or alters the right of the United States to determine how it shares the benefits
and results of its space activities.”39
While scholars have erred on the side of allowing greater use of outer
space resources, the text of the Outer Space Treaty itself is unclear. Even an
analysis of the history of the drafting of the Treaty does not clarify the issue,
most likely because the drafters themselves were divided.40 That ambiguity
reflects the two goals of the Outer Space Treaty and the inherent tension
between them: encouraging the dreams of space exploration and guarding
against the nightmares of a combative space race between states or the
domination of space by one state.
2. What are Celestial Bodies?
The Outer Space Treaty must also be interpreted in order to determine to
which entities in space it applies. The text itself repeatedly indicates when
the provisions apply to “outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies.”41 A debate has arisen over the meaning of “celestial bodies,”
though the meaning of outer space (the vacuum) and the moon (the one
prominent in the night sky) are much more obvious. There are many objects
in outer space that could fall under the meaning of “celestial bodies”:
galaxies, stars, planets, natural satellites (moons), comets, meteors, and
asteroids.42
One possible interpretation of the term “celestial bodies” comes from the
text of the treaty. The Moon Agreement indicates that it applies to celestial
bodies except for the earth and that it “does not apply to extraterrestrial
materials which reach the surface of the earth by natural means.”43 This
provision implies that all other extraterrestrial materials are “celestial
bodies.”44
Another proposed solution is to limit “celestial bodies” to natural objects
in outer space that cannot be moved by artificial means.45 This would

39

Wiessner, supra note 23, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. EXEC. REP.,
NO. 90-8 (1967)).
40
Johnson, supra note 22, at 1504–07.
41
See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10.
42
See generally Ernst Fasan, Asteroids and Other Celestial Bodies – Some Legal
Differences, 26 J. SPACE L. 33 (1998).
43
Moon Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1.
44
Fasan, supra note 42, at 35–36.
45
Id. at 40 (arguing further that if asteroids fell completely under the space treaties no state
would have the legal right to destroy an asteroid about to collide with the earth).
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potentially fulfill the drafters’ aim of dealing with larger space objects.46
Other scholars reject that distinction, arguing that it will change as
technology advances and that the movability of an asteroid is immaterial to
whether its minerals can be commercially extracted and moved elsewhere.47
These attempts at delineation may continue to be complicated by evolving
scientific knowledge and technological innovation. As with many other
statutes and treaties, some vagueness and the need for interpretation seems
inevitable.
B. The Liability Convention
1. The Standard of Liability
The Liability Convention furthers the rules outlined in the Outer Space
Treaty for state liability regarding space based activities. While the Outer
Space Treaty imposed liability on states, the Liability Convention establishes
standards for state liability. Article II of the Convention sets out the basic
rule: “A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for
damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in
flight.”48 There are two key points to draw from this rule. First, only states
are liable, not individual people or corporations. Second, when the damage
does not occur in outer space, there is strict liability for the damages.
Article III deals with damage that occurs in outer space itself and
establishes a fault based standard:
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the
surface of the earth to a space object of one launching State or
to persons or property on board such a space object by a space
object of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only
if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for
whom it is responsible.49

46

Id.
Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime for Exploitation of Outer Space Mineral
Resources, 88 NEB. L. REV. 794, 796 (2010).
48
Liability Convention, supra note 12, art. 2 (emphasis added). A “launching State” is
defined as “(i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object”; or “(ii) A
State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched.” Id. art. 1, para. c. Damage
includes “loss of life, personal injury, . . . or damage to property.” Id. art. 1, para. a.
49
Id. art. 3.
47
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Thus, as with the rule in Article II, only states have liability, and states are
responsible for the people it sends into space. Additionally, the damage must
be caused by a “space object.” This seems to leave open the issue of damage
caused by an individual person.50
The Liability Convention institutes other important rules in addition to the
standards for liability. Many of these rules are similar to American tort law.
The Liability Convention establishes joint and several liability when
“launching state” refers to more than one state.51 It also creates a standard
for contributory negligence to excuse absolute liability, when the claimant
acts with “gross negligence” or “intent to cause damage.”52 The Convention
explicitly does not apply to the “nationals of that launching state” or foreign
nationals involved in the “operation” or “launching” of the space object.53
2. Resolution of Disputes
When damage occurs, the Liability Convention outlines a two-tiered
process for bringing a claim against another state. The first path to bringing
a claim is through “diplomatic channels.”54 The most preferred result under
the Liability Convention is for states to deal with problems themselves
through diplomacy.
The Convention does, however, create a second option, should diplomacy
fail. If the states have failed to reach an agreement after one year, the parties
will set up a Claims Commission once either of the parties requests such a
commission.55 This second option represents an ad hoc solution that has the
potential to vary greatly. The Liability Convention prescribes the basic rules
for a Claims Commission. It consists of three members, one appointed by
each of the two parties and the third agreed upon by both parties.56 The
Claims Commission will evaluate the merits and decide on an amount of
compensation if necessary.57
The Liability Convention, however, limits the power of the Claims
Commission. The Commission’s decision is binding if and only if the parties
have agreed to that power beforehand. Otherwise, the Commission merely
50
For example, the Liability Convention does not appear to cover a tort between two
people on the same space station. Id.
51
Id. art. 5.
52
Id. art. 6.
53
Id. art. 7.
54
Id. art. 9.
55
Id. art. 14.
56
Id. art. 15.
57
Id. art. 18.
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delivers a reasoned recommendation.58 The Claims Commission does have
much greater power over how it reaches a decision. The Commission
decides on “its own procedure . . . where it shall sit and all other
administrative matters.”59
While the Liability Convention provides this two-avenue approach for
resolving disputes, it also gives great leeway to states to employ other
mechanisms. It leaves open the possibility of bringing suit in the launching
state: “Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a State, or natural or
juridical persons it might represent, from pursuing a claim in the courts or
administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching State.”60 It also allows
states to enter into their own agreements without interference from the
Liability Convention.61 Thus, current international law on liability in space
leaves open the possibility of having numerous different dispute resolution
avenues.
3. Some Open Questions
The Liability Convention is not comprehensive. It leaves several areas
unanswered or incomplete. One example is that the “Convention does not
deal meaningfully with problems that may arise when injuries are sustained
in the environment of space or on a celestial body.”62 Additionally, as
discussed earlier, there is a fault based standard for damage between space
objects in outer space, but it does not address other possible situations such
as torts between individuals.
Scholars and practitioners also debate about the meaning of “space
object.” The Convention itself defines a space object to include “component
parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”63 One
author argues that this raises two questions: First, does a launch vehicle also
have to enter outer space? Second, if an object is not launched but built in
space, is it still a space object?64 Another major issue is, quite literally, the
intersection between space law and air law. For a craft that travels into outer
58

Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 16.
60
Id. art. 11.
61
Id. art. 23.
62
Herbert Reis, Some Reflection on the Liability Convention, 6 J. SPACE L. 125, 127 (1978)
(suggesting that another treaty may be necessary once more people are in space). Herbert
Reis served as the chief negotiator for the U.S. on the Liability Convention from 1967.
63
Liability Convention, supra note 12, art. 1.
64
Dan St. John, The Trouble with Westphalia in Space: The State-Centric Liability Regime,
40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 686, 696 (2012).
59
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space but travels long distances in airspace, which law governs? Is the
vehicle a spacecraft or an aircraft?65 This question will be particularly
relevant for space tourism where the flights only enter outer space for a few
minutes but fly in airspace for much longer.66 Much like the difficulties with
classifying the term “celestial bodies,” these questions will need to be
resolved in some fashion by the international community. It can be
expected, however, that even with greater clarification some ambiguity will
remain, especially as technology advances.
C. Domestic and Foreign Law
1. Property Rights—United States Case Law
United States courts have not reviewed many space issues. It may be too
early in the commercialization of outer space activities to have too many
lawsuits develop. A U.S. District Court in Nevada has heard one case that
deals with an individual’s claim of private ownership of an asteroid.67 In
Nemitz v. United States a pro se litigant sought to prove his property rights
over a specific asteroid upon which NASA had landed a spacecraft.68 The
district court dismissed for failure to state a legal claim because neither
NASA provisions promoting the use of space, nor U.S. ratification of the
Outer Space Treaty created private property rights for Nemitz.69
While on the surface this case might preclude individual companies from
establishing property rights in outer space, it can easily be distinguished from
those hypothetical cases. Nemitz relied on a registration with the
Archimedes Institute website and filing a security interest under the Uniform
Commercial Code with the asteroid as collateral to establish his ownership.70
Neither of these creates private property rights.71 A company who lands a
spacecraft on an asteroid may have a better claim under a first in time, first in
right theory or because the company has actual possession. Congress has yet
65
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Compilation of Replies Received from
Member States to the Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace
Objects, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635 and Addenda (Jan. 26, 2005), available at http://www.uno
osa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/aero/index.html.
66
Chang, supra note 7.
67
Nemitz v. United States, 2004 WL 3167042, at 1 (D. Nev. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Nemitz
v. Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1–2.
70
Id. at 1.
71
Id.
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to allocate property rights in asteroids or other celestial bodies.72 It is
possible, however, that U.S. courts would further the logic of this court that
the Outer Space Treaty does not allow for private property rights.73
2. Liability—Statutory Law
The Liability Convention only applies to states, leaving to each country
the authority to make laws governing their nationals’ adventures beyond the
Earth’s atmosphere. In the United States Congress has enacted laws
specifically addressing outer space activities by private entities. The
Commercial Space Launch Act regulates and encourages the commercial
space flight industry.74 It lays out several requirements for a company to
obtain a license. The company must be financially responsible, take out
insurance (usually), and waive claims against the United States for any
damages it incurs while operating under its license.75 Thus, acting under the
Liability Convention, the United States attempts to shift some of the
responsibility to the companies themselves.
Other countries have their own statutory rules for outer space activities,
covering a range of space law issues.76 For the most part, however, these
rules are less thorough than the regulation in the United States.77 Because
only a limited number of states and corporations have the capability of
launching objects into space, parties wishing to send an object into space
often must make transnational business deals.78 This oftentimes creates legal
uncertainty because of the “potential applicability of different national laws
and legal regimes, which can conflict.”79 These transnational business

72
See, e.g., id. (holding that a private individual had no cognizable property rights in an
asteroid).
73
See Robert Kelly, Nemitz v. United States, A Case of First Impression: Appropriation,
Private Property Rights and Space Law before the Federal Courts of the United States, 30 J.
SPACE L. 297, 307 (2004) (arguing that control over asteroids by private persons or businesses
would constitute “national appropriation ‘by any other means,’ ” in violation of the Outer
Space Treaty).
74
51 U.S.C. §§ 50901–50923 (2012). The Commercial Space Launch Act was previously
Title 49, Section 70101, et seq.
75
Tennen, supra note 47, at 820.
76
For a collection of national space laws, see National Space Law Database, UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/Space
Law/national/state-index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
77
VALÉRIE KAYSER, LAUNCHING SPACE OBJECTS: ISSUES OF LIABILITY AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS 12 (2001).
78
Id. at 14.
79
Id. at 12.
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interactions will only occur with increasing frequency because of the
privatization of space exploration. Even with a handful of treaties in place,
the national law that exists is more detailed and more directly applicable to
businesses.
III. CURRENT PROPOSALS
Space law is a relatively new area of law. International space law is
limited to five short treaties;80 only one of which has very broad language.
The others have limited scope, dealing with early space law problems such as
the safe return of astronauts and tracking objects sent into space. Numerous
proposals have been made to improve space law. Most of the academic
proposals involve suggestions for new substantive rules and will be
discussed below. Few address how to administer these new rules or how to
resolve disputes arising under the proposed international legal frameworks.
This section will provide a brief overview of some of these substantive
proposals for property rights and liability in outer space.
A. Property Rights
The Outer Space Treaty leaves the availability of private property rights
in outer space unclear. Commentators worry that this uncertainty will
discourage commercial ventures beyond the earth’s atmosphere.81 To
address this concern, these commentators have proposed a variety of private
property schemes for outer space resources such as asteroids.
There are several key distinctions between these proposals. One is
whether or not to treat asteroids as real property or personal property. The
other is whether to use free market principles or the non-appropriation
principles of the Outer Space Treaty.
1. First Possession
Perhaps the most extreme proposal is to open up outer space following
first possession rules.82 This proposal treats celestial bodies as real property
and allocates property rights along a “first in time, first in right” rule similar
80

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, supra note 9.
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 22, at 1480.
82
See, e.g., Brandon C. Gruner, A New Hope for International Space Law: Incorporating
Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into The 1967 Space Treaty for The
Colonization of Outer Space in the Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 299 (2004).
81
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to homesteading in the nineteenth century United States, where settlers
rushed to claim unsettled land before others got there.83 Under this system a
“discovering nation” would be able to claim territory in outer space and
choose whether to open up settlement in its new territory to its own citizens
or to the international community as a whole.84 The sovereignty of the
“discovering nation” would extend to its outer space territory, where it could
govern as it pleased.85
A first possession scheme has several difficulties, even though it achieves
its chief goal of encouraging economic development. First, without a
centralized mechanism for demarcating the property, disputes are inevitable,
as was the case with homesteading in the West.86 Second, how will states or
settlers resolve these disputes? Territorial disputes do not often end well.87
If the international community, or members of the community, adopted a
“first in time, first in right,” system for divvying up property rights, states
may better avoid conflict by establishing clear expectations ahead of time,
particularly by agreeing on a framework for resolving disputes.
2. U.S. Common Law—The Estates
Other commentators propose a closer balance between encouraging
commercial exploration of space and maintaining the “province of mankind”
language of the Outer Space Treaty.88 One such proposal advocates having
an intergovernmental organization (IGO) such as the United Nations use
U.S. common law property rights to distribute property to private persons or
corporations.89 The twist is that the IGO would not transfer fee simple
absolute but less complete property rights such as a defeasible estate,

83

Id. at 344–47.
Id. at 347–48.
85
Id. at 350–51. Although Gruner does suggest some role for the Outer Space Treaty and
international law, it appears to be a secondary concern and subject to the whims of each
individual state as it colonizes space.
86
Teaching with Documents: The Homestead Act of 1862, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.
archives.gov/education/lessons/homestead-act/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
87
See, e.g., John Vazquez & Marie T. Henehan, Territorial Disputes and the Probability of
War, 1816–1992, 38 J. PEACE RES. 123 (2001) (supporting generally “the territorial
explanation of war” and stating that territorial disputes “account for the majority of wars”).
88
Davin Widgerow, Boldly Going Where No Realtor Has Gone Before: The Law of Outer
Space and a Proposal for a New Interplanetary Property Law System, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 490,
513 (2010).
89
Id.
84
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leasehold, or license, allowing the IGO to limit use of the property,
protecting the interests of all mankind.90
The author of this proposal, Davin Widgerow, admits the need for
adjudication of disputes arising under this system.91 The proposal suggests
three possible examples on which to base such a system of adjudication: the
Claims Commission from the Liability Convention, international arbitration,
and the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal.92 There
seems to be an inherent tension, however, between the common law
approach suggested earlier and these adjudication models, especially the
Claims Commission and arbitration. Because states create a Claims
Commission on an ad hoc basis and appoint arbitrators, these bodies would
likely lack the institutional memory and continuity that a court needs to
develop common law.
A standing body like the Seabed Disputes Chamber may have a better
chance but would need to be able to hear cases between two private entities,
not just between the IGO and its grantees.93 Basic property law suggests this
is insufficient. Property law cases are not always between the original
grantor and grantee. Additionally, the alienability of land contributes greatly
to its value. Granting inalienable territory would likely decrease the
incentive of private entities to purchase it from an IGO. The more sticks in
the bundle of property rights one receives, the more likely one is to buy.
3. Asteroids as Personal Property
Treating all celestial bodies as equivalent to land territory on the earth
may not reflect the nature of those celestial bodies. Some have argued that
international law must distinguish between asteroids and other celestial
bodies such as planets.94 Legally, asteroids could be treated as personal

90

Id. at 514–15. Note that this article assumes “province of mankind” means ownership of
mankind. Thus the UN or other IGO acts as the owner of outer space on behalf of all
mankind.
91
Id. at 515.
92
Id. at 515–16.
93
Widgerow’s article suggests that an adjudicatory body modeled off of the Seabed
Disputes Chamber would only “adjudicate disputes between the international community and
private . . . companies.” Id. at 516.
94
Andrew Tingkang, These Aren’t the Asteroids You Are Looking For: Classifying
Asteroids in Space as Chattels, Not Land, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 559, 561 (2012); see also
Fasan, supra note 42 (arguing that the difference between asteroids and other celestial bodies
requires each to have a separate definition under international law).
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rather than real property.95 One key characteristic of asteroids is that they are
more difficult to track than planets or real estate on earth.96 This makes an
asteroid seem more like a chattel, which may be lost.
This problem with tracking seems to make asteroids uniquely vulnerable
to disputes over ownership, particularly before a physical presence has been
established on the asteroid. Often, tracking fails and one asteroid is
identified as a different asteroid multiple times.97 This proposal does not
outline how these personal property rights are acquired.
What would happen if two private actors have claims to the same
asteroid? Even if asteroids are properly identified, disputes may still arise, as
they do on earth, over trespass to chattels, the sale of goods, and other issues.
The difference between asteroids and other chattels, however, is that the
property rights are based on international law, and the asteroids will likely be
owned only by corporations doing transnational business. People operating
in space will need a way to resolve disagreements whether asteroids are
treated as real property or personal property.
B. Liability
The Liability Convention and national legislation, such as the
Commercial Space Launch Act in the United States, govern the issue of
liability under space law. The body of law on liability, however, is often
incomplete. Drafted at a time when a small number of states were the only
actors venturing into outer space, the Liability Convention covers only a
limited set of possible facts.98 Many states do not even have domestic space
laws, and those that do typically lack the thoroughness of American law.99
People analyzing the Liability Convention widely agree that the law must
move away from its focus on states.100 Unlike property law concerns, many

95
Tingkang, supra note 94, at 579–86 (outlining differences between asteroids and planets
including their size, shapes, and the ability to move and split asteroids).
96
Id. at 581–82.
97
Id.
98
See, e.g., Reis, supra note 62.
99
KAYSER, supra note 77. The use of domestic law may further be limited because space
travel occurs outside a country’s territory in the sovereign-less expanses of space. See Beck,
supra note 24, at 22.
100
See, e.g., Beck, supra note 24, at 37 (“The Liability Convention’s complete failure to
hold private entities accountable poses problems for all commercial space developments.”);
see also St. John, supra note 64, at 711–13 (outlining problems with a “state-centric regime”
but concluding that the requirements of liability insurance and cross-waivers of liability will
have to do for now).
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proposals for changing space liability law address adjudicating these
transnational disputes as well as establishing substantive rules.
1. Market Share Liability
Some commentators argue in favor of changing the standard of liability.
The standard under the Liability Convention is typically strict liability.101
One proposal calls for the use of market-share liability to apportion
damages.102 The suggested scheme would attribute the market share of
unidentified space debris amongst states according to the percentage of space
debris identified as belonging to that state.103 This idea has become
increasingly popular with academics to solve the issue of liability for damage
from space debris.104 Like the pharmaceuticals to which market-share
liability was first applied, it can often be very difficult, if not impossible, to
determine the origin of space debris that may cause great damage to a space
object.105
This particular proposal attempts to work within the Liability Convention
by amending it to use market-share liability for damage caused by space
debris.106 Market-share liability may well be a successful solution for
dealing with the problem of space debris. Working within the framework of
the Claims Commission, however, does not add value to this substantive law.
In fact, in the United States, market-share liability was developed by courts,
not arbitration committees. The arguments made in this Note demonstrate
the need for a permanent court over an ad hoc commission, and they apply
with equal force whether the substantive rules call for strict liability, marketshare liability, or some other standard.
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution
The Claims Commission framework created in the Liability Convention
resembles arbitration more than a court. Some have argued that alternative
dispute resolution represents the best way to settle disagreements arising

101

Liability Convention, supra note 12, art. 2.
Mark J. Sundahl, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share Liability
Regime, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 141 (2000).
103
Id. at 144–45. This method would, at present, assign the United States a 52.9% market
share and Russia a 40.8% market share. Id. at 146.
104
Id. at 138–39.
105
Id. at 143.
106
Id. at 152–53.
102
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under international space law.107 Alternative dispute resolution has many
benefits and overcomes several shortcomings of international space law. The
difficulty, however, is that the usual problems associated with alternative
dispute resolution are greatly exaggerated in the space law context.
As discussed above, the Liability Convention and domestic law leave
several gaps in the legal framework, which private parties may be able to
overcome by using alternative dispute resolution. First, because parties to
arbitration agree to the governing law beforehand, there will not be the same
choice of law problems.108 Second, because parties can choose the
substantive and procedural law, these arbitrations would not have to follow
the strict liability standard articulated in the Liability Convention.109
Alternative dispute resolution may facilitate a fairer or more efficient
standard, whether it be fault based or market-share based.110
Several other potential benefits of alternative dispute resolution have been
articulated. First, it may be more cooperative rather than adversarial.111
Second, allowing private businesses to decide on the applicable substantive
and procedural law could lead to better outcomes.112 Finally, alternative
dispute resolution may be faster than recourse in the courts.113
While this system may benefit private businesses, it does not further the
other goals of international space law as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty,
nor does it address other gaps in the law involving individuals or states. The
Outer Space Treaty—the constitution of space law—makes it clear that the
law has dual objectives: encouraging space exploration and establishing that
all of mankind has an interest in outer space.114 Private businesses could use
alternative dispute resolution to duck the implications of public policy by
choosing other substantive and procedural rules. They can cherry pick the
law most favorable to business and least supportive of the province of
mankind principle.
Second, alternative dispute resolution does not further the goal of
cooperation in outer space. Any cooperation that occurs is only between the
107
Ka Fei Wong, Collaboration in the Exploration of Outer Space: Using ADR to Resolve
Conflicts in Space, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 445 (2006).
108
Id. at 466. Choice of law problems may arise particularly frequently in unanticipated
factual situations, such as if there was no “launching state” under international law because
the space object was built in outer space. Id. at 456.
109
Id. at 466.
110
Id. at 471.
111
Id. at 465.
112
Id. at 466.
113
Id.
114
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. 1.
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two private companies.115 This argument confuses the desire for interstate
cooperation with a desire for corporate cooperation. Instead, most people
want to foster competition between private businesses in order to incentivize
innovation and exploration of outer space.116 States are different animals
because interstate competition can lead to military conflict instead of better
business practices. The history of the space law treaties indicates the
overriding goal was to avoid conflict between the United States and the
Soviet Union and the militarization of space.117 Furthermore, extensive use
of alternative dispute resolution may limit the possibilities for fostering
interstate cooperation by taking states almost entirely out of the process of
resolving disputes.
Another drawback of alternative dispute resolution is that it generally
applies only in limited circumstances: disputes between private businesses.118
Generally, agreements to arbitrate disputes only occur between parties in
privity with one another.
How would this mechanism address a
disagreement over competing ownership claims over an asteroid? Such a
dispute does not necessarily arise out of a contract or any prior relationship
between the parties. The arbitrator or mediator would then have the power to
decide property rights between two parties when a third party may also have
a claim.119
Alternative dispute resolution would likely not provide a forum for
individuals with a claim against a corporation, unless the parties had a
contract. Furthermore, all of the usual complaints about alternative dispute
resolution, especially mandatory arbitration for consumers,120 also apply
when disagreements arise under space law. Thus, alternative dispute

115

See Wong, supra note 107, at 465.
See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 82 (advocating a competitive first in time, first in right
system for allocating property rights in outer space).
117
Beck, supra note 24, at 36 (“The international space treaty regime served its original
purpose well. The United States and the Soviet Union never undertook any significant
militarization of space.”).
118
Wong, supra note 107, at 466. Consider, however, the claim that “ADR could and
should be used to resolve most legal conflicts in space law.” Id. at 465.
119
United States federal courts, in contrast, would allow that third party to intervene. See
generally FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
120
Josha T. Mandelbaum, Stuck in a Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve the
Problems of Mandatory Binding Arbitration in the Consumer Context?, 94 IOWA L. REV.
1075, 1077 (2009) (“These problems include high fees, a lack of due-process safeguards,
unequal bargaining power, arbitrator bias toward the business, the bar of class-action suits,
potential private usurpation of the roles of the judicial and legislative branches, and society’s
inability to make good policy decisions going forward because of a lack of information.”).
116
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resolution should not be encouraged, and the international community should
think carefully about closely monitoring its voluntary use by private entities.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Barriers to Bringing Suit
Current international and domestic law provides limited avenues for
obtaining judicial relief with respect to complaints arising from events in
outer space. A number of barriers make it especially difficult for non-state
actors to pursue these types of claims.
1. Against a Foreign Defendant
A private plaintiff will have particular problems suing a foreign
defendant. Take, for example, an American space tourist who suffers harm
during a flight run by a Russian company departing from Russia.121
Depending on the specific facts, she will likely have problems suing in an
American court because of a lack of personal jurisdiction. A Russian
company, operating in Russia, likely does not have continuous and
systematic contacts with the United States sufficient to justify general
jurisdiction.122 The Russian company might not have purposeful contacts
with the United States sufficient to permit specific jurisdiction either, if the
company’s only contact with the forum state was the sale of a ticket to the
space tourist.123 Without jurisdiction in American courts, the tourist must
look elsewhere.
The alternative legal avenues are international and foreign law. The
Liability Convention would not provide an avenue for recourse if the
American government does not act.124 To sue in Russian courts, the space

121

Example adapted from Beck, supra note 24, at 22 (providing the hypothetical of an
American businessman on a space flight operated by Russia). Beck’s actual hypothetical is
discussed next.
122
See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (holding that
the sale of tires by a Goodyear subsidiary in North Carolina was insufficient to establish
general jurisdiction such that North Carolina courts could hear claims unrelated to Goodyear’s
contacts with the state).
123
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (holding that New Jersey
could not exercise jurisdiction over a foreign company whose only contact with New Jersey
was the presence of four machines that ended up in New Jersey).
124
Liability Convention, supra note 12, art. 7 (stating that claims are brought by one state
against another).
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tourist must rely on Russia’s domestic law.125 The high costs of travel and
litigating in a foreign court may prevent this suit from ever being filed in a
Russian court.126
The American tourist will have even greater difficulties if the Russian
government sold the space tourism flight instead of a private business. Even
if the tourist can obtain personal jurisdiction over the Russian government in
the United States, the suit may be barred by sovereign immunity.127 To
determine whether sovereign immunity applies, a court would first look at
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which grants immunity in American
courts to foreign states.128 There are several exceptions allowing a plaintiff
to bring suit, but it will be an uphill battle. The main exception applies when
the foreign state is engaged in a commercial activity.129 Whether the outer
space activity is a commercial activity will depend on the nature of the
conduct130 and the connection between the conduct and the United States.131
Extraterritoriality also presents a potential burden to suing in American
courts. Because the plaintiff’s claim is based on conduct in outer space,
outside of the sovereign territory of the United States, a court may decide not
to hear the claim. Whether or not the extraterritorial nature of the claim bars
the suit depends on the cause of action. If the plaintiff brings a statutory
based claim, then the court will decide whether the legislature intended the
statute to apply extraterritorially, but the courts presume statutes do not apply
extraterritorially.132
It is unlikely that causes of action that apply
125

See Beck, supra note 24, at 22.
See Van C. Ernest, Note, Third Party Liability of the Private Space Industry: To Pay
What No One Has Paid Before, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 540 (1991) (discussing the
impediment that travel costs and legal complexity would pose for parties utilizing a foreign
tribunal).
127
Beck, supra note 24, at 22.
128
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (“[A] foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605–1607 of this
chapter.”).
129
Id. § 1605.
130
See, e.g., Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (finding that the sale of
bonds by the Argentinian government constituted a commercial activity).
131
Marla Stayduhar, Flying the Friendly Skies May Not Be So Friendly in Outer Space:
International and Domestic Law Leaves United States’ Citizen Space Tourists Without a
Remedy for Injury Caused by Government Space Debris, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1,
¶¶ 27–28 (2006) (arguing that the commercial activity exception would be useful for a case
based on commercial space debris but not for a space tourist).
132
See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 390–91 (2005) (holding that the term
“convicted in any court” in a federal gun possession statute only applied to domestic
convictions because of a presumption that Congress intends statutes to have only domestic and
not extraterritorial effect, unless there is evidence to the contrary in the text, purpose, or
126
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extraterritorially would also apply to outer space because it is unlikely that
Congress intended to extend the reach of causes of actions that far.
Problems with jurisdiction, sovereignty, and extraterritoriality, combined
with the complications of filing suit in a foreign country, make it very
difficult for individual citizens to pursue claims arising out of conduct in
outer space.
2. Against the United States
It is unlikely that someone could successfully bring a tort claim against
the United States federal government for its actions in outer space. The
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) governs the government’s waiver of its
sovereign immunity to tort claims.133 The FTCA states “[t]he United States
shall be liable . . . to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.”134 The FTCA provides for exceptions to this waiver to
sovereign immunity, including for “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign
country.”135 Does that include claims arising in outer space?
Outer space is not a foreign country but the exception may still apply.
The Supreme Court has held that the foreign country exception in the FTCA
barred a wrongful death suit based on acts occurring in Antarctica because
Antarctica, even without a government, fit within the ordinary meaning of
“foreign country” and because such a reading prevented absurd results in the
rest of the statute.136 Because of the Court’s reasoning in that case, the Court
would very likely decide that outer space also constitutes a “foreign
country.”137 Congress could always amend the statute in the future, but for
now, individual plaintiffs likely cannot successfully bring outer space-based
claims against the United States.

legislative history of the statute); Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010)
(reaffirming the presumption against extraterritoriality).
133
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2006).
134
Id. § 2674.
135
Id. § 2680(k).
136
Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (holding that Antarctica is a foreign country
for purposes of the FTCA).
137
Lauren S.-B. Bornemann, This is Ground Control to Major Tom . . . Your Wife Would
Like to Sue but There’s Nothing We Can Do . . . The Unlikelihood That the FTCA Waives
Sovereign Immunity for Torts Committed by United States Employees in Outer Space: A Call
for Preemptive Legislation, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 517, 532–36 (1998).
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B. Towards a Solution
The shortcomings of the international law governing outer space are
clear. It was designed for a bygone era of state exploration of outer space
driven by the bipolar competition of the Cold War.138 It is conceivable that
in the future human behavior beyond Earth’s boundaries will more closely
resemble the extent and nature of human activity on Earth. Increased activity
in heretofore sovereignless space requires a new legal regime.
This new legal system must account for the interests of private
individuals and businesses in outer space. Under the Outer Space Treaty
each state “shall retain jurisdiction and control over” any object and
personnel it launches into outer space.139 This legal regime does not reflect
the reality that private businesses are taking the lead in industries like space
tourism.140
When disputes arise in outer space, they will need to be settled in
accordance with the governing substantive law. Currently, that law has two
main objectives: protecting the province of mankind and fostering economic
development of outer space resources. A successful legal regime will help
fulfill both of these goals and provide legal recourse to non-state actors.
A court with jurisdiction over outer space controversies will allow for
commerce to expand beyond the earth’s atmosphere. A system that can
provide legal security will provide greater incentives for investment.141
Current law creates great legal risk for investors because of the uncertainty
involved in interactions and potential conflicts of international and foreign
law.142

138

See Beck, supra note 24.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. 8.
140
Steven Freeland, Fly Me to the Moon: How Will International Law Cope with
Commercial Space Tourism?, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 90, 108–09 (2010) (arguing that a new
multilateral treaty should attach liability to the private conductors of space tourism flights
because it better addresses passenger and third party liability).
141
Michael Wollersheim, Considerations Towards the Legal Framework of Space Tourism,
SPACE FUTURE (Apr. 21, 1999), http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/considerations_towards
_the_legal_framework_of_space_tourism.shtml (“Especially for private enterprises that
perform commercial space activities such as space tourism, legal security—on a level of
private and public international law—is a mandatory requirement.”).
142
KAYSER, supra note 77, at 12, 14 (giving the example of satellite owners who have to
buy launching services from foreign countries and the further complications when some
businesses are state-owned and others are privately operated).
139
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Having a centralized court to adjudicate suits could create greater
predictability and legal certainty.143 First, businesses will know that they
will only be sued in one court. This allows the business to plan ahead to
reduce costs and risks.144 Second, the court will develop precedents that can
help inform decision makers who can then rely on consistent results.
A centralized court could also protect the interests of all mankind in outer
space. Judges would be picked by states instead of the litigants and would be
tasked with enforcing international law. Currently, that law protects the
interests of all of mankind.145 In contrast, other systems relying on national
laws will allow corporations to cherry-pick the national law that is most
favorable to them.146 If states maintain jurisdiction, then businesses will fly
under the flag of the state with the most business friendly laws. If
international arbitration is used, then businesses can select which nation’s
laws govern the dispute.147 These systems might allow outer space
businesses to avoid environmental or safety laws that increase costs but
benefit others.
For these reasons, a central court could serve a significant role in
protecting the international community’s twin goals for outer space:
promoting economic development and preventing unilateral exploitation at
the expense of others.
C. Jurisdiction—A Requirement for Success
An international outer space court will need several characteristics in
order to achieve success. In addition to the support of the international
community and legitimacy, it will need jurisdiction.
1. Sufficient Jurisdiction
An international outer space court may benefit from the jurisdiction
lessons of American courts. In particular, the idea of diversity jurisdiction
may be beneficial for an outer space court. Plaintiffs can bring suit in United
143
Note that these arguments have even greater weight if the international community also
agrees upon substantive law to govern outer space as well as the need for a court.
144
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987) (“When a
corporation purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of
burdensome litigation . . . .” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. 1.
146
Wollersheim, supra note 141.
147
Wong, supra note 107, at 466.
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States federal court when suing a defendant from another state for an amount
of money greater than the statutorily defined amount in controversy.148 The
purpose of diversity jurisdiction “is to provide a federal forum for important
disputes where state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, homestate litigants.”149
Just as federal courts are used to prevent problems arising from bias, an
international court could serve as a neutral forum for controversies between
parties of different countries. Bringing suit in the defendant’s country could
just as easily, if not more easily, allow for potential bias as bringing suit in a
different American state. Requiring diversity for the outer space court to
have jurisdiction could also limit its reach and possible encroachment on
countries’ sovereignty. The courts of each country could still hear suits
between or against its nationals.
2. Jurisdictional Problems
Even with jurisdiction, two problems may arise. First, with regards to the
issue of sovereign immunity, states would need to waive their immunity,
presumably through a multilateral treaty, in order for an international tribunal
to hear complaints against these sovereign governments. States could choose
to waive immunity entirely or, alternatively, to waive immunity only in their
own courts or to not waive immunity at all. No matter what the outcome is,
the existence of an outer space court will not make the problem arising out of
sovereign immunity any worse than it already is because states currently
control this decision. It may, however, encourage states to waive sovereign
immunity out of comity with other states.
The second problem related to jurisdiction is that potential litigants may
not have access to the court. One argument against an international court is
that it may be too costly to bring suit at all, especially for individuals,
because of travel expenses and other costs resulting from the complexities of
unique procedures in the court.150 Certainly, at some point, a plaintiff will be
unable to pursue a valid claim because she is unable to travel to the seat of
the relevant court.
This argument against an international court could also be made against
the status quo. The unfortunate aspects of the present situation could only be
improved, not worsened, by an international court. Under current law the
148

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 553–54 (2005).
150
Ernest, supra note 126, at 540 (concluding that “[t]herefore, it may be best to proceed
without the creation of the international tribunal”).
149
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indigent victim will often be unable to bring suit in her local courts.151
Indeed, in the United States, the Supreme Court has worried more about the
burden on foreign defendants being dragged into U.S. courts.152 Having one
court for outer space funnels disputes into one predictable location.
Furthermore, a potential plaintiff can always sue in the home courts of a
foreign defendant even though that may be costly and inconvenient.
D. International Implications
The idea of an international outer space court represents a significant
change to the international legal regime. It has the potential to greatly affect
international relations. In order to be beneficial, the court must obtain
legitimacy. There are two basic threshold issues necessary to achieve
international legitimacy. First, the court cannot be an ad hoc tribunal or it
will not send a clear, consistent signal to the international community that
justice will be served, hampering its legitimacy.153 Instead, this should be a
permanent, standing court.154 Second, the court must have American
support.155 Without those two elements, the court will likely fail to have a
lasting impact.
If the court can achieve that basic level of success, it has the potential to
improve international relations concerning outer space. A multilateral
approach to outer space exploration could foster cooperation, preventing

151

See supra Part IV.A.1.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (“The unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have
significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal
jurisdiction over national borders.”).
153
See generally International Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2004), http://www.nytimes.
com/2004/02/27/opinion/international-justice.html (explaining the problems with the trial of
Slobodan Milosevic).
154
This begs the question of how the international community should select judges. One
framework would be to work through the United Nations with the Secretary General
nominating and the Security Council approving potential judges. In the General Assembly,
the relatively small number of spacefaring nations invested in the status quo could be easily
outvoted. The judges should also be shielded from potential conflicts of interests by
insulating them in their terms of service. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 387
(1821) (describing the great importance of independent judges when comparing federal court
to state court judges).
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See generally Robert C. Johansen, The Impact of US Policy Toward the International
Criminal Court on the Prevention of Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity,
28 HUM. RTS. Q. 2, 301 (2006) (arguing that the United States’ failure to support the
International Criminal Court has undermined the ICC).
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competition and the militarization of space.156 An international court could
be the basis of that approach going forward. A court-based system created
out of a multilateral treaty encourages states and their nationals to resolve
their disagreements peaceably. If disagreements can be resolved in court and
enforced on Earth, then states will not have a strong incentive to use force to
protect their interests beyond Earth’s atmosphere. A cooperative framework
also has the potential to resolve disputes between developed and developing
states over the use of natural resources found in outer space.157 Crafting a
compromise for the substantive law will also play a major role in smoothing
over those differences, but a standing court at least provides a forum for
resolution of new quarrels among these repeat players.
V. CONCLUSION
The law governing outer space remains incomplete and unprepared to
deal with the changing nature of human activity beyond Earth’s atmosphere.
This represents an opportunity for the international community to fashion a
new legal regime for this ungoverned expanse. States must adopt new
substantive rules governing issues such as property rights and liability. Just
like with domestic laws, outer space law will require a means to settle
disagreements and unsettled areas of law. An international court whose
jurisdiction covers outer space represents an ambitious but optimal choice.
Done properly, it can ensure fairness, spur business, protect the interests of
all mankind, and encourage cooperation. The international community has a
blank slate on which to write, a chance to craft the best possible legal regime,
and it should not pass on that opportunity. Instead, it should chart an
ambitious path into outer space with the formation of a court for outer space.
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